International Conference   BUILDING INSIGHTS OF MANAGERIAL ECONOMICS AND ACCOUNTING TOWARDS SUSTAINABLE FOREST MANAGEMENT Ukrainian National Forestry University, Lviv, Ukraine May 17 � 19, 2007   IUFRO Unit 4.05.00 - Managerial Economics and Accounting IUFRO Unit 4.05.01 - Managerial, social and environmental accounting IUFRO Unit 4.05.02 - Managerial economics

Experimental Evidence about Community Members� Other-Regarding Behavior with Respect to Forest Management

Shashi Kant and Chander Shahi

Faculty of Forestry, University of Toronto, Canada

Email: Shashi.kant@utoronto.ca

An n-person (community members) asymmetric game, based on three behavioral strategies (defectors, enforcers, and cooperators), of Joint Forest Management (JFM) is formulated, and payoff matrix for five players is designed. The payoff matrix is used to conduct behavioral experiments in 38 villages of Gujarat and Himachal Pradesh states of India. In the experiments, players are selected from different socio-economic status � rich and poor, men and women, and landless and landholders, and the games are played under four treatments � no communication, face-to-face communication, light punishment and heavy punishment to defectors and proportionate rewards to enforcers. The game is played repeatedly for five times under each treatment. Under all the treatments, not all the members behave like an economic rational agent or there are strong experimental evidence of other-regarding behavior. Communication increases the intensity of other-regarding behavior. Women and landless people apply higher effort compared to other groups under communication indicating their higher dependence on forest resources. All groups of community members reduce their effort level under threats of punishment, but women and landless people are again not so deterred by these threats.  Under high probability of catch, all the groups except rich people reduce their effort level. The results of field experiments are used to suggest policy interventions for JFM.  

Keywords: joint forest management, evolutionary game theory, experimental economics, asymmetric games, heterogeneity

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